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The Ramshackle Edifice: Limitations Periods for
Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5
Allison Dabbs Garrett*
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have applied state statutes of limitations to private ac-
tions brought under section 10(b)' of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ("the Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-51 for forty years. In
1988 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals strayed from the well-
worn path, applying a federal limitations period to private actions
brought under Rule 10b-5. The decision was based on recent Su-
preme Court cases concerning the limitations periods for other fed-
eral causes of action. The Third Circuit's application of a federal
* Attorney, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.;
J.D., University of Tulsa, 1987.
The Securities and .Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility
for any private publication or statement by any of its -employees. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or
of the author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1983). Use of the term "Rule 10b-5" includes reference to
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act unless the context requires otherwise.
2. Rule 10b-5, promulgated under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
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limitations period to actions brought under Rule 10b-5 creates new
issues in an area of the law rife with uncertainty. The question of
which statute of limitations applies to private actions under Rule
10b-5 has been described as a "ramshackle edifice."'
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CONTROVERSY
Although injunctive actions brought by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission are not limited temporally,4 private actions ex-
pressly created under both the Exchange Act and the Securities
Act of 1933 are limited. A private right of action is implied under
Rule 10b-5.1 Because the right of action is implied rather than ex-
press, the Exchange Act does not contain a limitations period for
private 10b-5 actions. Aggravating the problem, none of the federal
catchall statutes of limitations apply.
6
3. Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 329 (1987).
4. SEC v. Glick,[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. fCCH) 1 97,535, at 97,793-
94 (D. Nev. June 12, 1980).
5. A private right of action was first read into Rule 10b-5 in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court has, on several occasions,
recognized the implied right of action. E.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 108 S. Ct.
978, 982-83 (1988); Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1983); Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.wHochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Superinten-
dent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
In addition to the implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5, private rights of ac-
tion have been implied under Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1988), and § 14(e) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e), § 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), and
certain sections of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64. See Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 15 (1970) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that a private
right of action exists for violations of § 14(e), although in this case plaintiff did not have
standing to assert the violation); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (holding
that a private right of action exists for violations of § 14(a)); Krome v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,
637 F. Supp. 910, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that private rights of action exist under §§
15, 17(a), 22, 34(a) and 36 of the Investment Company Act). Courts are split regarding
whether a private right of action exists for violations of § 17(a) of the Exchange Act. See
Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a
private right of action exists for violations of § 17(a)); contra Landry v. All American Assur-
ance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 1982).
6. In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,015, at 91,566 (D. Kan. Mar. 18, 1977). Among the catchall federal limitations
periods are 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1982), which limits the time period in which civil actions
may be brought against the United States to 6 years; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2415-2416 (1982), which
limits the time period in which certain actions may be brought by the United States; and 28
U.S.C. § 2462 (1982), which limits the time period in which actions for penalties, fines and
forfeitures may be brought.
The one catchall limitations period that might apply to private actions under Rule 10b-5
has been narrowly construed. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1982), provides that actions "for the en-
forcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise . . . [shall be] com-
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Not only does no statute clearly provide the limitations period
for 10b-5 actions, the Supreme Court has never ruled on the appli-
cable limitations period7 and lower courts have held that limita-
tions periods from elsewhere in the federal securities law do not
apply.8 Prior to the Third Circuit's decision, courts consistently
applied state limitations periods to private actions brought under
Rule 10b-5.
A. Historical Application of State Limitations Periods
The absorption doctrine, which is the practice of applying state
limitations periods to federal claims,9 is rooted in McCluny v. Sil-
liman.10 In McCluny, the Supreme Court applied an Ohio statute
of limitations for trespass on the case to a plaintiff's suit in federal
court against a registrar at a federal land office for refusing to rec-
ord an application to purchase land. The plaintiff filed the action
more than thirteen years after the incident. Use of the state limita-
tions period for trespass on the case was based on the principle
that statutes of limitations are the law of the forum and apply to
everyone who submits to the jurisdiction of the court." The deci-
menced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued. ... In Meeker v.
Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915), the Supreme Court held that the predecessor to
§ 2462 did not apply to redress of private injuries. Thus, no general federal limitations pe-
riod applies to 10b-5 actions. McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d
888, 891 (5th Cir. 1979); Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 613 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
The House Judiciary Committee reported H.R. 2788 in 1945. The bill contained a one-
year catchall limitations period for federal causes of action for money damages if no other
limitations period applied. H.R. REP. No. 1141, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. Had the bill passed, it
would have eliminated the need for courts to apply the absorption doctrine in Rule 10b-5
actions for money damages. It would not have affected application of the absorption doc-
trine to Rule 10b-5 actions for rescission.
7. Davis v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 839 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir. 1988) (Aldisert, J.,
concurring); In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1539 (3d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. 109 S.Ct. 131 (1988); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 461 (3d Cir.
1979) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). The practice of applying a state limitations period has been
accepted at least implicitly. See Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384 (1983);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n. 29 (1976) (stating, without comment, that
the law of the forum state provides a limitations period in Rule 10b-5 cases).
8. Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 876 n.5 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984) (holding that the statute of limitations in § 18 of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c), does not apply to actions brought under Rule 10b-5).
9. For thorough discussions of the absorption doctrine, see Note, Limitation Bor-
rowing in Federal Courts, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (1979); Note, Federal Statutes Without
Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 68 (1953).
10. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 269 (1830).
11. Id. at 275.
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sion was also based on a section of the Judiciary Act of 1789.2 The
section provided that state law shall be regarded as rules of deci-
sion in civil actions brought in federal court unless the Constitu-
tion, treaties or Acts of Congress otherwise provide.
In a later case, the Court applied a six-year Massachusetts tort
statute of limitations to a patent infringement action brought
nearly six years after the patent had expired. 13 Application of the
Massachusetts limitations period, however, was limited by the
Court's holding that a state statute of limitations does not apply if
the statute discriminates against federal rights or fails to give a
plaintiff a reasonable time in which to sue.1"
When courts began to read a private right of action into Rule
10b-5, they did not find a corresponding statute of limitations.
Consequently, the absorption doctrine was applied to a Rule 10b-5
action for the first time in Osborne v. Mallory" when the court
borrowed New York's six-year limitations period. The court relied
on the general rule that where a federal act does not provide a
limitations period, the law of the forum supplies the period." Not
until the Third Circuit's decision In re Data Access Systems Se-
curities Litigation,17 did any court abandon the tradition of apply-
ing the home state's limitations periods to 10b-5 actions.
B. Recent Changes in the Limitations Period for Implied Causes
of Action
The absorption doctrine seemed ingrained in the common law,"8
12. Id. (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (now codified as the
Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652)).
13. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1894). The Court's decision was based on
the power of the states to pass statutes of limitations which apply to federal rights, id. at
614-15, 618-20, and the Rules of Decision Act, id. at 614-15.
14. Id. at 615. If the statute discriminates against the federal rights, was passed in
"manifest hostility" to the federal rights, or shortens time too much, the courts have the
power to declare the statute unconstitutional and void. Id. The Court illustrated the mean-
ing of manifest hostility to federal rights by observing that a one-year limitation period for
patent infringement actions would be too short where the state applied a six-year limita-
tions period to all other tort actions. Id.
15. 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
16. Id. at 879.
17. 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).
18. The absorption doctrine has been applied almost without exception, for more
than a century. E.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1976); Auto Workers v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397-98 (1906); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905); Camp-
bell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 617 (1895). The few exceptions include:
(a) Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977), in which the Court applied a
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but the Supreme Court whittled it away in the 1980s in three deci-
sions from areas of law other than securities law. In two decisions
the Court held that the applicable limitations period should be
gleaned from the most similar federal statute rather than the most
similar state statute of limitations.19 In a third decision the Court
rejected a claim-by-claim approach to determining the limitations
period for section 1983 actions and held that the state limitations
period for personal injury actions applies to all section 1983 ac-
tions.20 These Supreme Court decisions opened a Pandora's box in
10b-5 cases. It is now unclear whether state or federal law should
provide the applicable limitations period for private actions under
Rule 10b-5.
1. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
DelCostello involved two consolidated cases where employees
sued their employers and unions for breach of a collective bargain-
ing agreement and breach of the duty of fair representation, re-
spectively. The issue was whether a state or federal statute of limi-
tations governed the employees' claims against the unions.
In the first case, Philip DelCostello filed suit against his em-
ployer and union in the District of Maryland. The defendants ar-
gued that his action was barred by Maryland's thirty-day statute
of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards.2 1 The dis-
trict court held that Maryland's three-year statute of limitations
for actions on contracts applied.22 However, the district court re-
considered its earlier holding and granted summary judgment for
the defendants following the Supreme Court's decision in United
Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,2 3 in which the Court held that a
state's limitation period for vacating an arbitration award applied
in a similar case.2 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
federal statute of limitations to EEOC enforcement actions;
(b) McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958), in which the Court applied
a federal statute of limitations from the Jones Act to unseaworthiness actions under general
admiralty law; and
(c) Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946), in which the Court applied a federal
statute of limitations to an action to enforce a federally created equitable right.
19. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987);
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
20. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
21. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-224 (1980).
22. 524 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1981) aff'd, 679 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1982) (D. Md. 1981)
(citing MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1980)).
23. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
24. 24. Mitchell did not address what statute of limitations governed the claim
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affirmed the district court's summary judgment for the
defendants.2 5
In the second case, two welders employed by Bethlehem Steel
Corp. filed suit in the Western District of New York against their
employer and union. The district court dismissed the complaint,
holding that New York's ninety-day statute of limitations for ac-
tions to vacate arbitration awards2 6 barred the suit. On appeal the
Second Circuit reversed the district court, relying on its holding in
Mitchell27 that the proper limitations period was New York's six-
year statute of limitations for actions on contracts.28 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and vacated and remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Mitchell.29 On remand, the Second Cir-
cuit, applying Mitchell, held that the ninety-day statute of limita-
tions for vacating arbitration awards governed. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the district court's dismissal as to the employer.
With respect to the action against the union, however, the court of
appeals reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that New
York's three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice ac-
tions applied.30
In the consolidated cases, the Supreme Court rejected the use of
the legal malpractice statute of limitations, and held that the
claims against the unions were governed by the six-month statute
of limitations found in section 10(b) of the National Labor Rela
tions Act. 1 The two determinative factors were that federal law
furnished a closer analogy than state law, and that federal policies
and the practicalities of litigation made the federal limitations pe-
riod "a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial law-
against the union or whether the limitations period from the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 160(b), should be borrowed.
25. 679 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1982) (mem.).
26. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 7511(a) (McKinney 1980).
27. 624 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1980).
28. Flowers v. Local 2602 of United Steel Workers, 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1980)
(mem.).
29. United Steelworkers v. Flowers, 451 U.S. 965 (1981).
30. 671 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court of Appeals followed Justice Stevens' sug-
gestion that the legal malpractice statute of limitations be borrowed. 451 U.S. at 72-75.
Although the Supreme Court admitted this was the closest state law analogy to breach of
the duty of fair representation, it rejected this approach in the 1983 DelCostello decision
because it "suffers from objections peculiar to the realities of labor relations and litigation."
462 U.S. at 167.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
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making." 2 The Court cautioned that despite its decision, applica-
tion of state statutes of limitations would remain the norm and
that it is unnecessary for a state limitations period to provide a
perfect analogy to be the preferred statute of limitations.33
2. Wilson v. Garcia
Gary Garcia filed a section 1983 action against a New Mexico
State Police officer and the Chief of the New Mexico State Police.
Garcia alleged that on April 27, 1979, the officer unlawfully ar-
rested and brutally beat him and that the officer was improperly
trained. The complaint was filed two years and nine months after
the arrest. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Garcia's
action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained
in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.3 4 The New Mexico Supreme
Court had previously held that this limitations period applied to
section 1983 actions. 5 Garcia argued that the New Mexico Su-
preme Court's decision was not controlling and that the applicable
limitations period was either three or four years.36
The district court held that New Mexico's four-year residual
limitations period applied. 7 The court rejected the New Mexico
Supreme Court's ruling that the two-year Tort Claims Act statute
of limitations applied since characterization of the cause of action
was a matter of federal law. The district court then certified an
interlocutory appeal.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of the motion to dismiss. 8 The court of appeals
agreed with the district court that the decision of the New Mexico
Supreme Court was not controlling39 and held that all section 1983
claims should be uniformly characterized as actions for injury to
personal rights. The court of appeals applied New Mexico's three-
32. 462 U.S. at 172.
33. Id. at 171. The Court recently reaffirmed this statement when it held in Reed v.
United Transp. Union, 109 S. Ct. 621 (1989), that North Carolina's personal injury limita-
tions period applied to an action under § 101(a)(2) of Title I of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2).
34. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(a) (1978).
35. DeVargas v. New Mexico, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982).
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978), provides that actions for injury to a person or
reputation must be brought within three years. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (1978), is a four-
year residual statute of limitations.
37. 471 U.S. at 264.
38. 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984).
39. Id. at 643, 651 n. 5.
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year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari' because of the "conflict, confu-
sion, and uncertainty concerning the appropriate statute of limita-
tions to apply to this most important, and ubiquitous civil rights
statute." 1
The Court announced a three-step approach to determine the
limitations period applicable to Garcia's section 1983 action. The
first step was to determine whether federal or state law governs
characterization of the claim. 42 Section 1988 states that the law ap-
plicable to civil rights claims shall be in "conformity with the laws
of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable."'" By the
language of the statute, characterization of the claim was a ques-
tion of federal law. 4
After concluding that federal law governs characterization, the
second step was to determine whether all section 1983 claims
should be characterized in the same way or should be characterized
depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.45 The fac-
tors relevant to this determination were whether the statute pro-
vided "a uniquely federal remedy, '4 6 policies underlying the claim,
and the need for certainty and uniformity.
Section 1983 provides a "uniquely federal remedy" because it is
designed to supplement rather than supplant available state reme-
dies.47 It was enacted to prevent violation of Constitutional and
federal rights under the auspices of state law.'8 There is no precise
counterpart in state law, making the remedy under section 1983
uniquely federal.
The Court held that the policies underlying section 1983 are best
served by characterizing all actions in the same way. Analyzing the
facts and circumstances surrounding each claim leads to uncer-
tainty and results in time-consuming litigation, frustrating the
40. 469 U.S. 815 (1984).
41. 471 U.S. at 266.
42. Id. at 268.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
44. Not only did statutory language support characterization as a matter of federal
law, the use of federal law was also consistent with other cases involving application of a
borrowed limitations period to a federal cause of action where the Court held characteriza-
tion to be a matter of federal law. 471 U.S. at 269-70 (citing Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardi-
nal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966)).
45. 471 U.S. at 268.
46. Id. at 271-72 (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972)).
47. 471 U.S. at 272.
48. Id.
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purpose of the statute. 9 In addition, the facts of a single case may
be so broad that several state limitations period apply.50
The Court concluded that certainty and uniformity were neces-
sary for effective enforcement of section 1983. The limited re-
sources of individual plaintiffs resulted in a need to bridle the
amount of litigation regarding collateral issues, such as the appro-
priate limitations period.5 ' The Court found that this policy could
be fulfilled by requiring application of a single limitations period
within each state and that nationwide uniformity was unnecessary
to meet this policy goal.52
The final step was to determine which state statute provides the
most appropriate limitations period. The Court reviewed the his-
tory of the Civil Rights Act and concluded that Congress intended
the Act to provide redress for injuries sounding in tort.53 Tort law
supplied the elements of a section 1983 action, as well as possible
defenses to the action.' It was a small step to also borrow the limi-
tations period from tort law. For these reasons the Court held that
the limitations period for personal injury actions applied to Gar-
cia's section 1983 claim. 5
3. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates
Malley-Duff and Associates, an insurance agency, filed a RICO5"
claim against Crown Life Insurance alleging that Crown formed an
"enterprise" for the purpose of taking over successful insurance
49. 471 U.S. at 272. Section 1983 actions vary greatly in factual bases. See, e.g.,
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (discharge of security guard for
false answers on a job application); Burnett v. Gratten, 468 U.S. 42 (1984) (discrimination
against college recruiters on the basis of race); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922
(1982) (seizure of property without notice or opportunity to be heard).
50. 471 U.S. at 274 (citing Chambers v. Omaha Pub. School Dist., 536 F.2d 222 (8th
Cir. 1976); Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc); Beard v. Stephens, 372
F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1967)).
51. 471 U.S. at 275.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 276-77.
54. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330 (1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-57 (1967); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
55. 471 U.S. at 279. The Supreme Court has also held that personal injury statutes of
limitations apply to actions brought under § 1981. See Owens v. Okure, 109 S. Ct. 573
(1989); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
56. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1982). A private cause of action is created under RICO which allows a plaintiff to recover
treble damages. Id. § 1964(c). Congress did not enact a statute of limitations to govern pri-
vate actions under RICO.
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agencies by setting bogus quotas and then terminating the agencies
for failure to meet the quotas. 7 Because federal law does not pro-
vide a limitations period for private actions under RICO, the dis-
trict court applied the limitations period for the state law cause of
action most similar to RICO. 8
Although the parties agreed that the state limitations period for
fraud applied, Pennsylvania's statute of limitations for fraud ac-
tions had recently changed. The parties disagreed over whether the
new two-year statute or the former six-year statute applied. The
district court applied the new two-year statute, but the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that Pennsylvania's six-year residual
statute of limitations applied.59 The Third Circuit based its deci-
sion on Wilson v. Garcia,6 ° holding that all RICO claims should be
characterized the same way in the interest of uniformity.
The Supreme Court rejected the Third Circuit's application of
Pennsylvania's residual statute of limitations because not all states
have residual statutes of limitations and the time periods vary
even among those states that have them. The Court reasoned that
the variety of limitations periods in different states would lead to
more litigation in cases involving choice of laws questions, espe-
cially where the predicate acts occur in more than one state, and
would encourage forum shopping.
The Court applied the four-year statute of limitations for private
actions under the Clayton Act.61 The Clayton Act was the template
for RICO and therefore provided a much closer analogy than state
causes of action.2 The Court found that a uniform statute of limi-
tations drawn from federal law was necessary for RICO actions be-
cause of the variety of facts and legal theories under which a RICO
claim might exist.6 3 This universe of possible legal theories made a
57. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341, 343-44 (3d Cir.
1986).
58. Id. at 344.
59. 792 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff
& Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
60. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982).
62. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985); see also Hearing on S. 30
Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess,
520, 543-44, 548, 559 (1970).
63. 483 U.S. at 149. The Court cited with approval A.J. Cunningham Packing Corp.
v. Congress Fin. Corp., 792 F.2d 330, 337 (3d Cir. 1986) (Sloviter, J., concurring), which
states:
RICO is similar to § 1983 in that both "encompass numerous and diverse topics and
subtopics." Many civil RICO actions have alleged wire and mail fraud as predicate
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uniform limitations period necessary to avoid time-consuming liti-
gation and to provide certainty to plaintiffs who might otherwise
lose their right of action by delay. 4 Certainty also allowed poten-
tial defendants to know when to write off contingent liabilities.65
C. Reaction to the Supreme Court Decisions
1. Judicial Activism in the Third Circuit
a. Pre-Data Access
Prior to the Data Access decision, the Third Circuit used a case-
by-case approach to determine the applicable limitations period16
The court first looked to the forum state's Blue Sky law. If the
state Blue Sky law did not protect the class of plaintiffs or did not
provide the type of remedy sought by the plaintiffs, the action was
deemed more similar to fraud than an action under state securities
laws. In those cases, the state's common-law fraud limitations pe-
riod was applied.
In Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc.,6 7 the plaintiff
sought money damages from a brokerage for churning. Although
the state Blue Sky law proscribed churning, it did not provide a
cause of action for money damages. Because the Blue Sky law did
not provide the remedy sought by the plaintiff, the court held that
the plaintiff's complaint could be construed as stating a cause of
action for fraud. The court then applied the limitations period for
common-law fraud. 8
Similarly, in Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co.6 9 the Third Circuit
held that New Jersey's six-year statute of limitations for common-
law fraud rather than a two-year statute of limitations under New
Jersey Blue Sky law applied to plaintiffs' 10b-5 claim. The Blue
Sky law protected only buyers, and the plaintiffs in this case were
acts, but 18 U.S.C. § 1961 defines "racketeering activity" to include nine state law
felonies and violations of over 25 federal statutes, including those prohibiting bribery,
counterfeiting, embezzlement of pension funds, gambling offenses, obstruction of jus-
tice, interstate transportation of stolen property, and labor crimes.
Id. (citations omitted).
64. 483 U.S. at 150.
65. Id. In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985), the Court stated, "In compelling
circumstances, even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten."
66. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
938 (1982); Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980); Rob-
erts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979).
67. 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980).
68. Id. at 610.
69. 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979).
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sellers. Because the plaintiff was not among those protected by the
state Blue Sky law, the court held that the limitations period for
fraud applied.
b. The Data Access decision
In Data Access the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the
matching approach used by the Third Circuit up to that time was
not in keeping with the recent Supreme Court practice found in
the DelCostello, Garcia, and Malley-Duff cases because it did not
promote the federal interest in uniformity. Like the RICO statute
at issue in Malley-Duff, Rule 10b-5 embraces a galaxy of actions. °
Using the claim-by-claim approach in an area where so many types
of actions may be brought resulted in litigation over the applicable
limitations period and led to uncertainty. The Third Circuit held
that all 10b-5 claims must be characterized in the same way to fur-
ther federal policies of uniformity and certainty in this area.
The Data Access lawsuit was brought by shareholders who pur-
chased common stock of Data Access Systems between 1978 and
1981. The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit shortly after the alleged fraud
came to light. Plaintiffs later filed second and third amended com-
plaints. In the third amended complaint, an attorney and an ac-
countant who had assisted Data Access in the preparation and fil-
ing of a registration statement and periodic reports were added as
defendants. The third amended complaint alleged that the attor-
ney had violated Rule 10b-571 and that the accounting firm had
aided and abetted a violation of the Rule. 2
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
applied New Jersey's six-year limitations period for common law
fraud actions to the 10b-5 claims. 73 The defendants argued that
the two-year statute of limitations from New Jersey's Blue Sky law
applied . 4 The district court certified the question of which limita-
tions period applied and stayed the proceedings pending the deci-
sion by the Third Circuit.
The Third Circuit determined that the liability provisions of the
Exchange Act provide a closer analogy to Rule 10b-5 than state
liability provisions. Rule 10b-5 and the express liability provisions
have, as a common purpose, compensation of similar injuries and
70. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1543.
71. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1538.
72. Id. at 1539.
73. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (West 1987).
74. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-71(e) (West Supp. 1989).
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all of the sections serve to create uniform nation-wide remedies
that fill voids in the common law.75 Based on this reasoning, the
court held that the one-year/three-year limitations period drawn
from sections 9(e), 18(c) and 29(b) of the Exchange Act 76 applied
to the claims under Rule 10b-5.7 The limitations scheme common
to nearly all provisions of the Exchange Act 78 requires the plaintiff
to bring an action within one year from the date of discovery of the
right of action, and in no event more than three years from the
date of the transaction. In addition, use of the limitations period
from a state liability provision would not meet the need for nation-
wide uniformity and certainty in the laws governing the nation's
securities markets.
c. Post-Data Access
While Data Access eliminated some of the confusion surround-
ing 10b-5 actions brought in the Third Circuit, it also sired a new
generation of issues. The Third Circuit held in Hill v. Equitable
Trust Co. 79 that Data Access and the three-year limitations period
it sets should be applied retroactively, making plaintiffs suits, filed
approximately four years after their purchases of limited partner-
ship interests, untimely. The court applied three criteria estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson80 to de-
termine whether Data Access applies retroactively. Those criteria
were: (1) whether the decision establishes a new principle of law
that overrules clear past precedent or decides an issue of first im-
pression, (2) whether retrospective application will hamper the op-
eration of the rule in dispute, and (3) whether retrospective appli-
cation creates the risk of inequitable results. The Third Circuit
75. 843 F.2d at 1548.
76. Section 9(e) provides, "No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability cre-
ated under this section, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts con-
stituting the violation and within three years after such violation." 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1982);
see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78r(c), 78cc(b) (1982).
77. The court stated:
[Tihe proper period of limitations for a complaint charging violation of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 is one year after the plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the vio-
lation, and in no event more than three years after such violation.
843 F.2d at 1550.
78. The one-year/three-year scheme is used almost consistently in the Exchange Act.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(c), 78cc(b) (1982); but see 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982) (two-year
outside limit for short-swing profit actions). The one-year/three-year scheme is also used in
the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982).
79. 851 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied. 109 S. Ct. 791 (1989).
80. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
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found that, with respect to the Data Access decision, the first and
third factors favored retrospective application and that the second
factor was neutral. Therefore, the court applied the Data Access
decision retroactively."1
Data Access was also applied retroactively in Gatto v. Meridian
Medical Associates, Inc.s2 Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
had violated Rule 10b-5 and sought rescission of their investments
under section 29(b) of the Exchange Act."s The plaintiffs had pur-
chased limited partnership interests from the defendants in late
1981. They filed suit in federal court in late 1987. The defendants
moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds and the district
court, applying Data Access retroactively, granted the motions. 4
The Third Circuit again upheld retroactive application of Data Ac-
cess, stating,
when plaintiffs sue under section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act for
rescission of a transaction alleging that the transaction violated section
10(b) or Rule 10b-5, they must do so within one year of their discovery of
the facts underlying their claim and, in any event, no longer than three
years from the transaction itself."
In Graham v. Oil Field Systems Corp.86 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered
whether an earlier ruling that a six-year limitations period applied
would be vacated in light of Data Access, which was decided dur-
ing pendency of the case. Because the Third Circuit has already
held in Hill that the Data Access decision applies retroactively, the
court vacated its earlier holding that Pennsylvania's six-year
residual limitations period applied.8 7 The court also held that the
three-year time limit drawn from federal securities laws is an abso-
lute bar and that the doctrine of equitable tolling did not save the
81. The Third Circuit reached the same result in McCarter v. Mitcham, 883 F.2d 196
(3rd Cir. 1989), again finding that the first and third Chevron criteria favored retroactive
application of Data Access and that the second criterion was neutral. Id. at 205. But see
ITG, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 697 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Gruber v. Price
Waterhouse, 697 F. Supp. 859 (E.D. Pa. 1988), in which United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that Data Access applies prospectively only. The
court reasoned that to hold otherwise would deny a day in court to a plaintiff who delays
filing an action on the basis of well-established precedent.
82. 882 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1989).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982).
84. 882 F.2d at 841.
85. 882 F.2d at 844.
86. No. 85-3887 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
87. Id.
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plaintiff's claim.8
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet addressed the
issue of whether equitable tolling applies to Rule 10b-5 actions.
However, by adopting the three-year outside limit from federal se-
curities laws, the Third Circuit has implicitly accepted the three-
year repose period as an absolute bar to actions brought outside
the period.
2. Reaction of Other Courts
Other circuits lamented the confusion caused by the three Su-
preme Court decisions even prior to the Data Access decision. In
Norris v. Wirtz, 9 after a jury trial in which damages were awarded
to the plaintiff, the Seventh Circuit held that the suit was barred
by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff claimed that it was not
until more than ten years after the transactions in question that
she realized she had been defrauded.90 The plaintiff claimed that
Illinois law of trusts supplied the tolling doctrine applicable to her
case." The district court agreed, and ruled that the plaintiff's sta-
tus as a trust beneficiary tolled the running of the limitations pe-
riod.92 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the Illinois toll-
ing doctrine with respect to trustees was not appropriate for
securities cases.
9 3
Judge Easterbrook, who drafted the court's opinion, called the
statute of limitations issue a "ramshackle edifice '94 and observed
that this area of law is a mess.95 Despite the confusion, the court
stated that it would not act unilaterally, but would wait for the
imprimatur of higher authority to bring uniformity and predict-
ability to this area of the law.96
The Seventh Circuit again criticized the current state of the law
in Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos9 7 The
88. Id.
89. 818 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
90. Id. at 1331.
91. Id.
92. Id. The court applied a three-year limitations period from Illinois Blue Sky law.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, Para. 137.13D (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988). Application of the Blue
Sky law limitations period is consistent with Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000,
1004 (7th Cir. 1984), and Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 125-27 (7th Cir.
1972).
93. 818 F.2d at 1333.
94. Id. at 1332.
95. Id. at 1333.
96. Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
97. 815 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1987).
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court stated that it would sit tight until Congress remedied the
confusion by enacting a uniform limitations period. 8
In Davis v. Birr, Wilson & Co.,9  Judge Aldisert of the Ninth
Circuit authored a concurring opinion to draw attention to the
confusion. He concluded that the one-year/three-year limitations
scheme from federal securities law was a closer analogy to Rule
10b-5 than state statutes.100
Judge Milton Pollack, an outstanding jurist in the area of federal
securities law, recently considered this newly-dynamic area of law
in Ceres Partners v. GEL Associates.'0° The plaintiff sued for
damages under sections 10(b), 14(d) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5. The plaintiff's claim under each section was based
on an implied cause of action.
The defendant purchased Gelco stock from the plaintiff and
later that same day announced plans to acquire control of Gelco.
The plaintiff asserted that the defendant's purchase of stock from
it was subject to Rules 14(d) and 14(e) governing tender offers and
that the defendant's failure to file a Schedule 14D-1 announcing
the tender offer violated sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the Exchange
Act. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendant violated Rule
10b-5 by not disclosing its intent to propose a merger with Gelco.
The plaintiff brought the action more than two years after the
transaction date even though the plaintiff knew of the defendant's
trades on the day they occurred.
The defendant moved to dismiss the lawsuit on statute of limita-
tions grounds. The plaintiff was a New Jersey partnership, and the
defendant argued that New York's borrowing statute required ap-
plication of New Jersey law. New Jersey courts, sitting in the
Third Circuit, apply the Data Access one-year/three-year limita-
tions period borrowed from federal securities law. Judge Pollack
borrowed New Jersey law and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.
It is important to note that Data Access is not the law in the Sec-
ond Circuit or the Southern District of New York. Borrowing stat-
utes required application of Data Access in Ceres, but the holding
is limited to the borrowing context.
In dictum, Judge Pollack discussed whether the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,102 which contains a
98. Id. at 455.
99. 839 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir. 1988) (Aldisert, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 1374.
101. 714 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
102. Section 21A of the Exchange Act, to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1. Judge Pol-
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five-year limitations period, would be the most analogous federal
limitations period.103 Because the plaintiff had not alleged misap-
propriation of inside information, he found that the ITSFEA did
not provide the most analogous limitations period. Instead, he
found the claim similar to a claim under section 12(1) of the Secur-
ities Act, 10' providing purchasers with a claim against an issuer
who is obligated to, but fails to, file a registration statement. Ac-
tions under section 12(1) must be brought within the one-year/
three-year period set out in section 13 of the Securities Act.
105
Even if the claim in Ceres had been similar to a claim under the
ITSFEA, Judge Pollack nevertheless would have left the law as it
stands, reserving for a higher court the task of remaking the law.
He quoted Judge Learned Hand's remark that it is not "desirable
for a lower court to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of antici-
pating a doctrine which may be in the womb of time, but whose
birth is distant."106 A higher court will soon have the opportunity
to rule on the issues presented in Ceres. The case has been ap-
pealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.107
Although the courts are dissatisfied with the current state of the
law, no other circuit has followed the Third Circuit in applying a
federal limitations period to 10b-5 actions.108 Despite the confu-
lack referred to the 1988 Act and the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §
78u-1, collectively as the Insider Trading Act. To prevent confusion between the 1988 Act
and the 1984 Act, the 1988 Act is referred to here as ITSFEA.
103. The Act was passed after the Data Access decision and therefore was not con-
sidered by the Third Circuit.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77(i).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 77m.
106. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1944). This was
not the first case in which Judge Pollack quoted Judge Hand on this point. In Mittendorf v.
J.R. Williston & Beane Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), Judge Pollack stated, "Com-
mon sense and logic dictate that application of the limitation contained in the 1933 and
1934 Acts to 10b-5 claims would be preferable as a matter of Federal Securities Laws pol-
icy." Id. at 830 n.4. In light of Judge Hand's admonition against lower courts remaking the
law, however, he did not ground the holding on the limitations issue in Mittendorf "on the
notion that a uniform period of limitation should be applied .. " Id.
107. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 714 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), appeal dock-
eted, No. 89-7666 (2d Cir. July 11, 1989). The Securities and Exchange Commission filed an
amicus brief with the Second Circuit in Ceres urging the same points made in its amicus
brief to the Supreme Court in Lebman. See infra text accompanying notes 220 to 226.
The Second Circuit is well-positioned to apply a uniform federal limitations period to
actions under Rule 10b-5. In Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co., 878 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1989),
the court held that a uniform federal rule of setoff applies to Rule 10b-5 actions, and in
Durante Bros. & Son, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, 755 F.2d 239, 243-44 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 473 U.S. 906 (1985), the court applied a federal limitations period to a claim under the
National Banking Act for which there was no express statute of limitations.
108. See, e.g. Durham v. Business Management Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1988)
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sion, the Supreme Court has refused to address the statute of limi-
tations issue in Rule 10b-5 cases. The Court denied the plaintiffs'
petition for a writ of certiorari to the Third Circuit in Data Ac-
cess,10 9 and has refused to consider the issue in later cases. " °
III. PRACTICALITIES OF LITIGATION
A. Why Seek Uniformity?
In Chardon v. Fumero Soto"' Justice Rehnquist stated, "Few
areas of the law stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily ap-
plied rules than does the subject of periods of limitation."'' 2 Al-
though this need for uniformity and certainty exists in 10b-5 ac-
tions, " ' courts have acknowledged that precedent dissuades them
from developing a uniform limitations period. " 4 Balanced against
this tradition of applying state limitations periods, however, are
several factors that weigh heavily in favor of a uniform limitations
period for private 10b-5 actions.
1. Prevent time-consuming litigation
One reason for establishing a uniform statute of limitations is to
(rejecting the Third Circuit's approach).
109. cert. denied sub nom, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).
110. In Lehman v. Aktiebolaget Electrolux, 854 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1988) (Table), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3214 (1989), and Corwin v. Marney, Orton Inv., 843 F.2d 194 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom, 109 S. Ct. 305 (1988), the Court refused to review Fifth Circuit deci-
sions holding that the statute of limitations under Rule 10b-5 was two years in Texas. The
Court has also declined to review the Third Circuit's ruling retroactively applying the "in no
event more than three years after the violation" language of the statute. Data Controls
North, Inc. v. Equitable Bank, N.A., 851 F.2d 691 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 791
(1988); see also Northrop v. Lease Fin. Corp., 853 F.2d 919 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
391 (1988).
111. 462 U.S. 650 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112. 104. Id. at 667.
113. See generally Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule 10b-5 Claims:
A Study in Judicial Lassitude; 60 U.CoLo. L. REv. 235 (1989) (making a case for applying a
federal limitations period to 10b-5 actions).
114. In McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 891-92 (5th
Cir. 1979), the court stated:
By dint of repeated application in every circuit, with the evident approval of the
Supreme Court and without legislative reaction by Congress, that basic rule is at this
point definitely established. We are therefore compelled to apply it rather than follow
the logically appealing course of applying the period of limitations applicable to a
similar cause of action expressly provided in the federal securities laws. Although the
latter approach would lead to desirable uniformity in securities litigation from state
to state and would eliminate the need to engage in difficult and essentially esoteric
comparisons of federal and state remedies, reform must await congressional action.
Id. at 891-92 (citations omitted).
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prevent time-consuming litigation over which state statute ap-
plies.115 The potential limitations periods range from a ten-year
common law fraud statute to a one or two-year Blue Sky statute of
limitations. 6 Limited judicial resources, attorney time and client
money are wasted litigating the applicable limitations period.
Professor Loss has observed that "[t]his reference to state law
makes for a great amount of utterly wasteful litigation ... .
Likewise, the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Ac-
tions stated that "[alny uniformly applied limitations period would
be a vast improvement over the present situation, which needlessly
consumes enormous amounts of time and results in unwarranted
disparities in the rights of parties bringing and defending actions
under rule 10b-5."
'' 8
2. Encourage private enforcement
State statutes of limitations are not drafted for the purpose of
furthering national policies." 9 Therefore, federal courts must care-
fully consider whether applying a state limitations period will
"frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national poli-
cies. '  With respect to private 10b-5 actions, courts should con-
115. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. 483 U.S. 143 (1987) (citing
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985)). The Court stated, "Under these circumstances,
therefore, as with § 1983, a uniform statute of limitations is required to avoid intolerable
'uncertainty and time-consuming litigation.'" Id. at 150.
After the Third Circuit's decision in Data Access, courts must deal not only with the
question of which state statute of limitations applies, but also with the question of whether
a federal statute applies. This further complicates and protracts cases that are already of
marathon length.
116. For example, the period applicable to actions brought in Maryland is one year,
while in Tennessee the period is ten years. American Bar Association, Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied
Actions, 41 Bus. Law. 645, 663, 665 (1986) (Appendix B) (citing O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d
15 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981) (applying Maryland's one-year Blue
Sky limitations period); and Denny v. Performance Sys., Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,387 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 5, 1971) (applying Tennessee's ten-year
fraud limitations period).
117. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 1168 (1983) (at least 500 possi-
ble statutes of limitations); see also Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 329 (1987) (citing Tellis v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 805 F.2d
741, 747 (7th Cir. 1986) (Ripple, J., dissenting)).
118. American Bar Association, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Re-
port of the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 Bus. LAW. 645,
658 (1986).
119. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC,, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).




sider whether the statute of limitations at issue promotes private
enforcement of the federal securities laws.
One danger of a short limitations period is that fraud will not be
discovered until the limitations period has run, preventing private
litigants from enforcing the securities laws. Some courts have ex-
pressed concern that a short limitations period will prevent private
litigants from enforcing the securities laws.121 Although this danger
does not exist under a discovery statute, the danger does exist if
the absolute three-year bar from federal securities laws is adopted.
Without the benefit of the discovery rule, the short limitations pe-
riod would protect potential defendants rather than investors.
Abandoning the absorption doctrine and applying a federal limita-
tions period will fulfill the policy favoring private enforcement only
if investors are adequately protected by a statute of sufficient
length or that uses a discovery test.122 A second danger of a short
limitations period is that plaintiffs will sacrifice their rights
through delay. Arguably, however, the burden of a plaintiff's inde-
cision about whether to bring an action should not be borne by the
defendant.
The limitations period for fraud under the American Law Insti-
tute's proposed Federal Securities Code provides that suit must be
brought within one year of discovery of the fraud, and in no event
later than five years after the transaction.12 3 This proposal is some-
121. In IDS Progressive Fund, Inc. v. First of Mich. Corp., 533 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir.
1976), the court stated, "[t]he broad remedial purposes of the federal securities laws are
best served by a larger, not a shorter statute of limitations." (quoting United Cal. Bank v.
Salik, 481 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973)); see also Herm v. Staf-
ford, 663 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1981); Carothers v. Rice, 633 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 998 (1981); Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1976); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402 (2d
Cir. 1975); Campito v. McManus, Longe, Brockwehl, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 986 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
122. One disadvantage to retaining the discovery rule is that enormous amounts of
time will continue to be spent litigating equitable tolling issues. Nevertheless, adoption of
any federal limitations period will do away with litigation regarding choice of laws.
123. American Law Institute, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, § 1727(b) (1980). The section
reads:
FRAUDULENT ACTS, ETC.-An action under sections 1703 to 1707 inclusive or
section 1709, 1710, 1717, or 1720 may not be brought more than-
(1) one year after the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known the underly-
ing facts; or
(2) five years after any of the following events:
(A) in the case of sections 1704 to 1706 inclusive, (i) the effective date of the regis-
tration statement, offering statement, or distribution statement (or, with respect to a
security sold after the effective date of an amendment under section 508(a)(5), the
effective date of an amendment), or (ii) the date of any other filing;
(B) in the case of section 1703 or 1707, the date of the plaintiff's purchase or sale;
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what more investor-oriented than the Third Circuit's approach,
but still has the dangers inherent in a non-discovery statute.
12 4
3. Provide certainty for defendants
One purpose of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose is
to provide certainty to potential defendants and those who trans-
act business with them.12 5 In Norris v. Wirtz the court found that
the legislative history of the securities laws supported this pol-
icy.126 That court stated, "The legislative history in 1934 makes it
pellucid that Congress included statutes of repose because of fear
that lingering liabilities would disrupt normal business and facili-
tate false claims. ' 12 A uniform statute of limitations for Rule 10b-
5 actions would provide economic comfort to defendants once the
time in which plaintiffs may press their claims has passed.
4. Prevent forum shopping
In a 10b-5 action, venue may be proper in any of several fora.
Section 27 of the Exchange Act allows actions to be brought where
the violation occurred or where the defendant is found, is an in-
habitant, or transacts business.1 28 Potential defendants in a 10b-5
and
(C) in the case of section 1709, 1710, 1717, or 1720, the date of the last act consti-
tuting the violation or other conduct on which the action is based, but no damages
may be awarded under section 1720(a) for a period of more than the twelve consecu-
tive months immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.
Id. The language of the section does not state that the five-year period is an absolute cutoff
date. However, comment 1 to the section states that the section is to be construed as barring
any action brought more than five years after the events giving rise to the complaint.
124. The drafters of the FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE noted that lengthening the limita-
tions period seems inconsistent with the Congressional purposes of the limitations period,
stating, "[I]f the Code, in making most of today's implied actions express were to follow
Congress' limitations pattern, which seems logical enough at first blush, the net effect would
be to shorten the plaintiff's time." American Law Institute, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE §
1727 comment 1 (1980).
125. Tension necessarily exists between this policy, which benefits defendants, and the
policy favoring private enforcement of the securities laws, which benefits plaintiffs.
126. 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, U.S. (1987) (citing H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 32, 36, 42 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 8198-8203 (May 7, 1934)).
Accord Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 271 ("In compelling circumstances, even wrongdoers
are entitled to assume that their sins are forgotten.").
127. 818 F.2d at 1332. See also Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 463 (3d
Cir. 1979) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting) ("the shorter period permits the company's management
to treat a given securities transaction as closed, allowing them to proceed more confidently
with running the company").
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
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action may be located across the United States.129 These factors,
along with nationwide service of process under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4, lead to forum-shopping by plaintiffs.
The variety of limitations periods available under 10b-5 encour-
ages plaintiffs to shop for a forum with a long limitations period if
there is a chance that the action will be barred in another forum
by a short period. For example, if venue were proper in both
Oklahoma and Michigan, an Oklahoma plaintiff could choose to
bring his action in Michigan, which applies a six-year limitations
period 30 rather than in Oklahoma, which applies a two-year limi-
tations period. 31 An additional boon to plaintiffs is that in class
actions, a careful choice of forum might resurrect the stale claims
of class members whose claims would be barred if brought in an-
other forum. 32
Forum shopping would be less pervasive in securities actions if
all courts applied borrowing statutes. Because borrowing statutes
require application of the law of the place where the claim ac-
crued, 33 forum shopping is less effective since the same limitations
129. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 758 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring), Justice Powell observed, "Issues are usually marketed through underwriters
and dealers, often including scores of investment banking and brokerage firms across the
country."
130. Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967).
131. Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir.
1974).
132. Block & Barton, Statute of Limitations in Private Actions Under Section
10(b)-A Proposal for Achieving Uniformity, 7 SEc. REG. L. J. 374, 378 (1980). Accord State
Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 80 F.R.D. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); and Raymond v.
Miller & Schroeder Municipals, Inc., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,714 (D. Minn. June 29, 1983), both applying the limitations period of the state with the
most significant contacts to class actions involving plaintiffs from more than one state.
There are two limits to the use of this stratagem to resurrect stale claims of class mem-
bers. First, if the claims of a large portion of the class are resurrected by the application of a
longer limitations period from the class representative's home state, the class representa-
tive's claim may not be considered "typical" as required by FED. R. Civ. P. 23. A second
important limit on use of this strategem is the constitutional limit raised by application of
one state's laws to class members from other states. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985) ( A state "must have a 'significant contact or significant aggrega-
tion of contacts' to the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff class . . . in order to
ensure that the choice of [a state's] law is not arbitrary or unfair.") (quoting Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
133. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. § 202 (McKinney 1972), states:
An action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state cannot be com-
menced after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of either the state or the
place without the state where the cause of action accrued, except that whether the
cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of the state the time limited by the laws
of the state shall apply.
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period will likely be applied regardless of where the action is
brought. Even universal application of borrowing statutes can be
tricky. Borrowing statutes generally apply the law of the place
where the action accrued, which may be either the place where the
transaction occurred, or the place where the economic impact is
felt. 13 In addition, a court can become mired in confusion when
several actions filed in various courts are consolidated. Because the
transferee court must apply the law of the transferror court,135 the
borrowing statutes of several states may apply.
13
1
A uniform, nationwide limitations period for Rule 10b-5 actions
will do away with the advantages of forum shopping. Plaintiffs
would no longer be able to toy with the limitations period by
choice of a forum.
5. Prevent proof problems in long-term cases
Private 10b-5 actions are often very complex and frequently in-
volve several classes of plaintiffs. As a result, the cases lumber
through the judicial system. Extremely long limitations periods or
liberal tolling doctrines may result in proof problems in cases that
span many years. For example, in Norris v. Wirtz1 37 several plain-
tiffs died or lost their memories during the nineteen-year time
span between the time of the sales and the time of trial. This type
of situation makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the finder of
fact to make an informed decision. 138 It also prejudices defendants,
who may no longer have access to exculpatory evidence.
6. Broad nature of Rule 10b-5
A final reason for seeking uniformity in 10b-5 actions is the
Rule's broad nature. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are catchall pro-
visions designed to prevent manipulative or deceptive practices in
securities transactions.1 39 Violations of Rule 10b-5 are probably al-
134. See Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1977), holding that under 10b-5, the
place of accrual is the state of the plaintiff's residence.
135. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
136. In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Lit., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
96,015 (D. Kan. Mar. 18, 1977).
137. 818 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 329 (1987).
138. In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the Court stated, "Just determinations
of fact cannot be made when, because of the passage of time, the memories of witnesses
have faded or evidence is lost." Id. at 271. Accord Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S.
424, 428 (1965); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944).
139. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980).
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leged more frequently in private actions than violations of any
other provision of the federal securities laws. Rule 10b-5 is broad
both in the types of activities within its purview and in the variety
of entities that may be liable under the Rule. For example, Rule
10b-5 violations have been alleged against issuers,140 inside trad-
ers,14 1 accountants, 42 lawyers,4 3 brokers, 4 4 underwriters,145 and
market manipulators. 46 The ubiquitous nature of the Rule makes
it important that a plaintiff in New York be on equal footing with
a plaintiff in New Jersey.
B. Examples of the Lack of Uniformity
1. Limitations period
Stipulation by the parties in multistate transaction cases as to
which state's law applies solves only part of the limitations period
quandary. Courts must muddle through two additional is-
sues-what statute of limitations applies, and, if amended, does
the old or new version of the statute apply.
First, within a given state a number of limitations periods may
apply.'47 Among the possible limitations periods are the periods for
claims under Blue Sky laws, 48 for fraud, 49 for tort actions, 50 or a
140. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 981 (1988); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
141. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983).
142. Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
143. Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981).
144. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 301-303 (1985);
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1975); Wohl v. Blair
& Co., 50 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
145. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974).
146. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977).
147. Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987),
states, "There are many potentially analogous state statutes, with variations for different
kinds of securities offenses and different circumstances that might toll the period of
limitations."
148. See Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943
(1987); Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, 788 F.2d 1500, 1507
(11th Cir. 1986); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 360 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 823 (1986); Andrews v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 771 F.2d 184, 186 (7th Cir. 1985);
Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1984); Diamond v. Lamotte,
709 F.2d 1419, 1424 (11th Cir. 1983); Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 679 (6th Cir. 1981);
Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst, 625 F.2d 151, 156 (7th Cir. 1980); O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 18
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981); Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 600 F.2d
139 (8th Cir. 1979); Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1977); LaRosa
Building Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 542 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1976); Fox v. Kane-
Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d
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residual limitations period.151
Blue Sky law limitations periods are applied by some courts be-
cause of the similar purpose of federal and state securities laws.'"a
Typically, Blue Sky laws proscribe misstatements and material
omissions in the sale of securities. 153 Blue Sky law limitations peri-
ods have also been applied where the scienter requirement under
the Blue Sky laws is similar to the scienter requirement under
Rule 10b-5.15
4
On the other hand, the scienter requirement has led some courts
to apply the limitations period for common-law fraud rather than
Blue Sky laws in situations where the Blue Sky laws do not con-
402 (2d Cir. 1975); O'Connell v.-Economic Research Analysts, 499 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 125-27
(7th Cir. 1972); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970).
149. Davis v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 839 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1988); Marx v. Centran
Corp., 747 F.2d 1536 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985); Mosesian v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1984); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79
(2d Cir. 1983); Breen v. Centex Corp., 695 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1983); Loveridge v. Dreagoux,
678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982); Industrial Consultants, Inc. v. H.S. Equities, Inc. 646 F.2d 746
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 838 (1981); International Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d
909 (2d Cir. 1980); McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 598 F.2d 888 (5th Cir.
1979); Briskin v. Ernst & Ernst, 589 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978); Gaudin v. KDI Corp., 576
F.2d 708 (6th Cir. 1978); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1977); Nickels v. Koehler
Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); Dzenits
v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974); Azalea Meats, Inc. v.
Muscat, 386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967).
150. Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1987); General Build-
ers Supply Co. v. River Hill Coal Venture, 796 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1986).
151. Lamb v. United Secur. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 44 (S.D. Iowa 1973). This approach has
been rejected in other areas of the law because not all states have catch-all statutes of limi-
tations. In Agency Holding Co. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987), the
Court stated, "In Wilson v. Garcia . . . we rejected the use of a 'catchall' statute of limita-
tions because we concluded that it was unlikely that Congress would have intended such a
statute of limitations to apply. Furthermore, not all States have a 'catchall' statute of limi-
tations .. " Id. at 153.
152. White v. Sanders, 650 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981); Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co.,
600 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1979); Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Del. 1981).
153. The UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT, after which Blue Sky laws are patterned, states:
Any person who offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not mis-
leading (the buyer not knowing of the untruth of the omission), and who does not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
case could not have known, of the untruth or omission, is liable to the person buying
the security from him. ...
UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT, § 410(a)(2).
154. Goodman v. Moyer, 523 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Brick v. Dominion Mortgage
& Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
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tain a scienter requirement.' 55 Similarity between the reliance re-
quirement under Rule 10b-5 and for common-law fraud has also
led courts to apply the common-law fraud limitations period. 15
Common-law fraud limitations periods have also been applied
where Blue Sky law failed to protect both the buyer and the
seller.
157
On rare occasions tort limitations periods or residual limitations
periods have been applied to Rule 10b-5 actions. The First Circuit
has applied the limitations period for personal injury actions with
a dearth of analysis in each instance.' a In one case, Lamb v.
United Security Life Co.,' 9 the Southern District of Iowa inexpli-
cably applied Alabama's residual limitations period to a 10b-5 ac-
tion commenced in Alabama and removed to Iowa. The decision is
unusual because neither the Fifth nor the Eighth Circuits apply a
residual limitations period to 10b-5 actions.
Usually, the choice of a limitations period is between the fraud
and Blue Sky law limitations periods. Two circuits straddle the
fence, applying both a fraud and Blue Sky limitations period, de-
pending on which state's law governs the action.'8 °
In addition to determining what limitations period applies, a
second issue a court may face is whether an old or new version of
an amended statute of limitations applies.' 6 ' Some courts have
155. Wood v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 643 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981) (no scienter re-
quirement under Texas Blue Sky law); In re Alodex Corp. Sec. Lit., 533 F.2d 373 (8th Cir.
1976) (no scienter requirement under Iowa Blue Sky law).
156. Wood, 643 F.2d 339; Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
157. Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979); Kirk v. First Nat'l
Bank, 439 F. Supp. 1141 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye, 392 F. Supp. 484 (N.D.
Ohio 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 588 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978).
158. Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123, 127 (1st Cir. 1987); General
Builders Supply Co. v. River Hill Coal Venture, 796 F.2d 8, 11 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1986); Holmes
v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 561-62 (1st Cir. 1978); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 783 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Sleeper v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 480 F. Supp. 1264
(D. Mass. 1979), aff'd, 627 F.2d 1088 (1st Cir. 1980).
159. 59 F.R.D. 44 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
160. The Fifth Circuit applies the fraud statute of limitations to actions governed by
Texas law, Breen v. Centex Corp., 695 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1983), and the Blue Sky limitations
period to actions governed by Florida and Louisiana law, Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 600
(5th Cir. 1988); O'Connell v. Economic Research Analysts, 499 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). The Sixth Circuit applies the fraud statute of limitations to
actions governed by Ohio and Michigan law, Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 1536 (6th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985); Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967),
and the Blue Sky limitations period to actions governed by Kentucky law, Carothers v. Rice,
633 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1980).
161. In Fox v. Kane-Miller, 398 F. Supp. 609, 641 (D. Md.), aff'd 542 F.2d 915 (4th
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held that the limitations provision in effect at the time the cause of
action accrues applies,162 while other courts have held that the lim-
itations provision in effect at the time of the acts complained of
applies. 163 Both the issue of what statute applies and whether old
or new versions of the statute govern increase the likelihood of a
battle of the briefs.
2. Commencement of the action
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 governs when an action is
commenced for statute of limitations purposes where federal law
expressly provides a limitations period. 64 Rule 3 states that an ac-
tion is commenced by the filing of a complaint. 65 State laws often
provide that an action is commenced when the complaint is filed
and the defendant is served, adding a second criterion to com-
mencement. The only court to address the issue of whether state or
federal law governs commencement held that Rule 3 applies to
commencement of implied causes of action as well as expressly cre-
ated causes of action.
1 66
3. Commencement of the limitations period
Although the statute of limitations is gleaned from state law, the
date at which the statute begins to run is a matter of federal law."6 7
Cir. 1976), the court stated of this situation, "It would seem that a federal court should not,
because of subsequent changes in state statutory law, move its own federal 10b-5 limitations
period up and down like a yo-yo on a string." Id. at 641. Accord McNeal, 598 F.2d at 893 n.9
(describing it as "undeniably untidy to insist that the statute of limitations applicable to a
federal cause of action vary from time to time dependant upon changes in local law"); Nick-
els v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074
(1977); IDS Progressive Fund, Inc. v. First of Mich. Corp., 533 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 1976);
Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Invest., Inc., 440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971).
162. McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 892-93 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1979).
163. Mooney v. Tallant, 397 F. Supp. 680, 681 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
164. Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 states, "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with
the court." See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1056
at 177 (1969), for a discussion of the application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 3.
165. Despite the clear language of Rule 3, litigants have argued the application of the
rule to certain unusual circumstances. See, e.g., Leggett v. Strickland, 640 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.
1981) (no commencement where the complaint mailed to the clerk of the court was returned
for insufficient postage); Biby v. Kansas City Life Ins., 629 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1980) (filing a
complaint with a court that likely could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant as a ploy to toll the statute of limitations is not "commencement").
166. Sentry Corp. v. Harris, 802 F.2d 229, 233 (7th Cir. 1986).
167. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946); Durham v. Business Manage-
ment Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 725
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1021 (1987); Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185,
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Under federal law, knowledge of specific facts is not required to
place a plaintiff on notice of fraud and commence the running of
the statute of limitations. A modicum of evidence may be enough
to arouse suspicions. Where a plaintiff has an overall knowledge of
a fraudulent scheme, but does not know the specific conduct of a
particular defendant, this is sufficient to commence the running of
the statute of limitation.1 6 8 In the oft-quoted language of Klein v.
Bower, 69 the running of the statute of limitations does not await
the plaintiff's "leisurely discovery of the full details of the alleged
scheme."
There are several red flags that impart to potential plaintiffs suf-
ficient knowledge to place them on inquiry notice and commence
the running of the statute of limitations. These red flags include
newspaper articles about the company, 7 ' a sharp rise or fall in the
price of securities,17 1 letters and confirmation notices revealing un-
usual or unexpected events, 172 other lawsuits,'173 financial irregular-
189-91 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981); Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 432
(2d Cir. 1977).
168. Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1977); Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338 (2d
Cir. 1970).
169. 421 F.2d at 343 (quoted in CPI Crude, Inc. v. Coffman, 776 F.2d 1546, 1553
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985); Gieringer v. Silverman, 731 F.2d 1272, 1277 (7th Cir. 1984);
Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1975); Campbell v.
Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 727 (W.D. Mich. 1980), afJ'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982);
Turner v. First Wis. Mortgage Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899, 906 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Rhoads v.
Harvey Publications, Inc., 145 Ariz. 142, -, 700 P.2d 840, 845 (Ariz. App. 1984)).
170. State of Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 690 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981); Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 644 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1981); Westchester Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 626
F.2d 1212, 1218 (5th Cir. 1980); Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 1969); Upton v.
Trinidad Petroleum Corp., 468 F. Supp. 330 (W.D. Ala. 1979), aff'd, 652 F.2d 424 (5th Cir.
1981) (while newspaper articles along with other storm warnings may place a plaintiff on
notice, newspaper articles alone were held insufficient to start the statute running); Turner
v. First Am. Mortgage Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899, 906 (E.D. Wisc. 1978).
171. Gaudin v. KDI Corp., 576 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1978) (decline in the price of
stock sold over-the-counter from more than $400,000 to less than $60,000 during an eight
month period "should have put plaintiffs on notice that something was wrong").
172. Koke v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 620 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1980); Lang v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 582 F. Supp. 1421 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Verrecchia v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, 563 F. Supp. 360 (D.P.R. 1982); Militsky v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 783 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Murray v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,
524 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Dandorph v. Fahnestock & Co., 462 F. Supp. 961 (D.
Conn. 1979); Winkelman v. Blythe & Co., 394 F. Supp. 994 (D. Or. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 530
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975).
In Koke the court stated:
The confirmation slips and monthly account statements which were sent to [plaintiff]
were sufficient to require the initiation of an inquiry. While they are not a model of
clarity for the novice investor, they provide information sufficient to require a reason-
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ities,17" actions by the SEC,76 or knowledge of illegality.176
4. Tolling doctrines
Since the inception of the absorption doctrine in the early 1800s,
courts have faced the issue of which state limitations periods and
which tolling rules apply.177 The tolling doctrine is an important
issue because the burden of proof may differ depending on which
tolling doctrine applies. 17 8 In addition, the legal standard applied
able person to ask questions. Even if [plaintiff] did not understand them, she was not
free to ignore them, and that is what she did; she did not examine them carefully and
did not ask anyone to explain them.
620 F.2d at 1343-44.
173. Breen v. Centex Corp., 695 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1983) (suit by former company
president put shareholders on notice of fraud); Westchester Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitch-
ell & Co., 626 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1980) (two other lawsuits similar to plaintiffs' placed
plaintiffs on notice); State of Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687,
695 n. 17 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981) (state's participation in earlier bank-
ruptcy of company put state on notice of fraud); Gaudin v. KDI Corp., 576 F.2d 708 (6th
Cir. 1978) (five other lawsuits alleging violations of the federal securities laws were 'among
the factors placing the plaintiffs on notice); Herm v. Stafford, 455 F. Supp. 650, 653 (W.D.
Ky. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1981) (insolvency proceed-
ings put plaintiffs on notice); Braunstein v. Laventhol & Horwath, 433 F. Supp. 1077
(S.D.N.Y.), afJ'd, 573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1977) (another lawsuit and the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy put plaintiffs on notice).
174. Westchester Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 626 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir.
1980) (national accounting firm withdrew its certification of the company's financial state-
ments and was dismissed as the company's auditor); Cook v. Avien, 573 F.2d 685 (1st Cir.
1978) (uncertified financial statements in the annual report along with information showing
losses put plaintiffs on notice).
175. State of Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981) (SEC filed a complaint against a broker); Herm v. Stafford,
455 F. Supp. 650, 653 (W.D. Ky. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 669 (6th
Cir. 1981) (suspension of trading by SEC put plaintiffs on notice); Turner v. First Wis.
Mortgage Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899, 905 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (suspension of trading by NYSE
put plaintiff on notice). Often, action by the SEC or an exchange and newspaper articles go
hand in hand. When the SEC files an action or suspends trading, the event is generally
reported in the Wall Street Journal or other financial publications.
176. Goldstandt v. Bear Stearns & Co., 522 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1975) (plaintiffs had a
duty to obtain independent advice regarding whether a method of short selling recom-
mended by their broker was legal); Goldenberg v. Bache & Co, 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959)
(plaintiff had knowledge of sufficient facts to enable her to determine she was in violation of
the margin requirement).
177. In Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943,
(1987), the court stated:
Thus when courts began to imply private rights of action from other substantive pro-
visions, they did not find corresponding statutes of limitations. In accordance with
long federal practice, they borrowed the statutes of limitations for "analogous" state
law. Which state law, and with what tolling rules, has been nettlesome ever since.
Id.
178. Several courts have held that the burden of proof, or burden of persuasion, rests
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 28:1
may be either objective or subjective. 179 Theissue is also important
because under different tolling doctrines, the rules regarding stack-
ing of tolling events may differ. i80
a. federal applies
Although state law provides the applicable limitations period,
federal law determines when the clock starts running.' 8' Federal
law governing the tolling of a cause of action for fraud was first
stated by the Supreme Court in Bailey v. Glover.'82 The Court
held that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
fraud is discovered." 3 Because 10b-5 actions sound in fraud, the
statute of limitations is tolled until the fraud is or should have
been discovered. 84 If the tolling doctrine did not apply, "the law
which was designed to prevent fraud [would be] the means by
which it is made successful and secure.'
85
Fraudulent concealment, also known as federal equitable tolling,
on the party asserting the tolling doctrine. Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 329 (1987); General Builders Supply Co. v. River Hill Coal Venture,
796 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1986); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 695 (1st Cir. 1978).
179. Under the objective standard, the plaintiff must exercise the diligence of a rea-
sonable investor to discover the fraud. Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1126-27 (6th
Cir. 1982); McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 598 F.2d 88, 893 n.ll (5th Cir.
1979); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 427 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970); Morgan v. Koch,
419 F.2d 993, 997-98 (7th Cir. 1969); Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.
1959). The subjective standard recognizes an individual plaintiff's sophistication. State of
Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 408 (D. Colo. 1979), aff'd,
651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
180. If two tolling events occur consecutively, under some tolling doctrines, the statute
of limitations is tolled for the duration of both events, creating yet another issue for the
courts to address in every 10b-5 action. One court expressed relief at not being asked to
address the issue when it stated, "Mercifully [plaintiff] does not ask us to 'stack' tolling
rules in this case, so we need not decide whether this is permissible." Norris v. Wirtz, 818
F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 329 (1987).
181. Gaudin v. KDI Corp., 576 F.2d 708, 711 (6th Cir. 1978); Azalea Meats, Inc. v.
Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1967?).
182. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1875).
183. The Bailey Court stated:
[W]here the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or
want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until
the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the
part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other
party.
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 348; see also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946).
184. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999,
1008 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 954 (1981).
185. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 342. 349-50 (1875).
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is read into every federal statute of limitations.1 8 ' However, the
courts almost uniformly hold that applying the doctrine of federal
equitable tolling to the express limitations periods under the Se-
curities Act is not consistent with the legislative purposes of those
limitations periods and therefore does not apply.18 7 Only one case
addresses whether equitable tolling applies to the one-year/three-
year limitations scheme under the Exchange Act, an important dis-
tinction because Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under the Exchange
Act. In Walck v. American Stock Exchange,1 88 the court used the
rationale which other courts have applied to the Securities Act,
and held that equitable tolling does not apply to section 9(e) of the
Exchange Act. The court reasoned that because the limitations pe-
riod under the Exchange Act incorporates a discovery rule, just as
the limitations period under the Securities Act, Congress intended
that the limitations period be absolute. Application of the federal
tolling doctrine would, therefore, not further Congressional
purposes.
With respect to Rule 10b-5 actions, the tolling doctrine has been
applied consistently where the underlying facts supported toll-
ing."8 ' Thus, the question raised by application of the one-year/
three-year scheme from federal securities law is whether the doc-
186. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946). Although the doctrine applies
to all federal statutes of limitations, it is not applied inexorably. In American Pipe & Con-
str. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558 (1974), the Court stated application of the doctrine de-
pends on "whether tolling the limitation in a given context is consonant with the legislative
scheme." Id.
For an exhaustive treatment of the topic of fraudulent concealment, see Marcus, "Fraud-
ulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More Disparate Standard?" 71 GEo. L.J.
829 (1983).
187. Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982);
Summer v. Land & Leisure, Inc., 664 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1106 (1982); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1055 (2d Cir. 1969); Zola v. Gordon,
685 F. Supp. 354, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Dahl v. Gardner, 583 F. Supp. 1262, 1264-65 (D.
Utah 1984); Benoay v. Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490, 496 (E.D. Mich. 1981);Turner v. First Wis.
Mortgage Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899, 911 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Cowsar v. Regional Recreations,
Inc., 65 F.R.D. 394, 396-97 (M.D. La. 1974). Compare In re Homestake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig.,
76 F.R.D. 337 (N.D. Okla. 1975), in which the court held that the equitable estoppel doc-
trine-as opposed to equitable tolling-can be sufficient to toll the statutes of limitations
under the federal securities laws. The equitable estoppel doctrine is based on wrongdoing of
the defendant which estops the defendant from pleading the statute of limitations. Because
the Homestake decision relies on equitable estoppel, rather than equitable rolling, it is argu-
able whether it contradicts the weight of authority.
188. 687 F.2d 778, 792 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983). The Third
Circuit rejected the lower court's finding that equitable tolling applies to actions brought
under section 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e).
189. See generally Comment, Plaintiff's Duty of Care After Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 158, 175 (1978).
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trine of fraudulent concealment, or equitable tolling, remains ap-
plicable to 10b-5 actions. If the tolling doctrine does not apply,
plaintiffs' efforts to recover under Rule 10b-5 will be seriously
hampered. There are two types of fraudulent concealment that toll
the statute of limitations. The first type of concealment is passive
concealment, where "the fraud goes undiscovered even though the
defendant after commission of the wrong does nothing to conceal it
and the plaintiff has diligently inquired into its circumstances."190
In passive concealment cases, the statute of limitations is tolled
until the fraud is or should have been discovered. The statute of
limitations is tolled in such cases only if the plaintiff exercised due
diligence to uncover the fraud.191
If a plaintiff asserts the tolling doctrine, the plaintiff must prove
that facts which would have placed him or her on notice of fraud
were concealed.' 92 If the plaintiff knew, or should have known, of
the fraud but fails to file an action in a timely manner, summary
judgment is appropriate. 9 '
The second type of fraudulent concealment is active conceal-
ment. In active concealment cases, "the fraud goes undiscovered
because the defendant has taken positive steps after commission of
the fraud to keep it concealed." 19' Courts are divided on the ques-
tion of whether active concealment requires due diligence on the
part of the plaintiff. 95
The Seventh Circuit has held that the federal tolling doctrine
190. Goldstandt v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 522 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1975); accord
McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 787 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
191. Goldstandt, 522 F.2d at 1268.
192. Cook v. Avien, 573 F.2d 685, 695 (1st Cir. 1978); Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 996
(7th Cir. 1974); Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 727 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
193. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980); Gaudin v. KDI Corp.,
576 F.2d 708 (6th Cir. 1978); Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1035 (1978); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1977); Schaefer v. First Nat'l
Bank, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Klein v. Bower, 421
F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1970); Sleeper v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 480 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mass.
1979), af'd, 627 F.2d 1088 (1st Cir. 1980); Humphrey v. J.B. Land Co., 478 F. Supp. 770
(S.D. Tex. 1979); First Fed. Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Mortgage Corp. of the South, 467 F.
Supp. 943 (N.D. Ala. 1979), af'd, 650 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1981); Herm v. Stafford, 455 F.
Supp. 657 (W.D. Ky. 1978), aff'd, 663 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1981); Osadchy v. Gans, 436 F.
Supp. 677 (D.N.J. 1977); In re Alodex Corp. Sec. Litig., 392 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Iowa 1975),
af'd, 533 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1976).
194. Id.; accord McConnell, 574 F. Supp. at 787.
195. Compare Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir. 1979), and
Sperry v. Barggren, 523 F.2d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 1975) (both cases holding that due diligence
is required in passive concealment cases, but not in active concealment cases), with State of
Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 895 (1981) (holding that due diligence is required even in all cases).
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rather than state tolling doctrines apply to the borrowed statutes
in 10b-5 actions, 96 and application of the federal doctrine rather
than state doctrines has been hinted at in Supreme Court deci-
sions."9 7 The Tenth Circuit has also reached the same conclu-
sion.19 8 Adoption of the federal tolling doctrine has been strongly
encouraged on the grounds that it helps promote uniformity
among the federal circuits.19
b. state applies
Application of federal tolling law is at odds with certain Su-
preme Court cases holding that the entire law, including tolling
doctrines, is adopted along with a state limitations period. °0 In
three cases, the Supreme Court has held that when federal law in-
corporates a state statute of limitations, the entire law is incorpo-
rated, including state tolling doctrines. 01 In Hardin v. Straub, °2
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.2 °3 and Board of Regents
v. Tomanio20° the Court held that in section 1983 actions, state
tolling doctrines are incorporated along with state limitations peri-
ods unless the state tolling rules are inconsistent with federal poli-
cies. Section 1983 cases are not analogous to 10b-5 cases in this
respect because the Civil Rights Act expressly incorporates state
law when necessary to furnish suitable remedies.0
The Fourth Circuit held that state tolling doctrines applied to a
10b-5 action in O'Hara v. Kovens. 06 The court applied the limita-
tions period from Maryland Blue Sky law and held that the tolling
provisions applicable to that law also applied to the plaintiff's ac-
196. Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1331 (7th. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987);
Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1984); Goldstandt v. Bear,
Stearns & Co., 522 F.2d 1265, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1975); Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 509
(7th Cir. 1975); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1972).
197. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610
(1895).
198. Ohio v. Peterson. Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 691-92 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
199. Hannah v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 462-63 n. 1 (1965); Moviecolor, Ltd. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
200. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 486 (1980).
201. Hardin v. Straub, 109 S.Ct. 1998, 2001-02 (1989); Board of Regents v. Tomanio,
446 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1980); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64
(1975).
202. 109 S.Ct. 1998 (1989).
203. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
204. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
205. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
206. 625 F.2d 15, 19 (4th Cir. 1980).
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tion under Rule 10b-5. Because Maryland law did not provide for
tolling on the grounds of incompetence, the court held that the
plaintiff's action was not tolled. The Seventh Circuit has also
stated that state tolling rules apply.2"'
c. both federal and state tolling doctrines
The Seventh Circuit took a unique approach to the issue of
whether federal or state tolling doctrines apply in Suslick v. Roths-
child Securities Corp.20 8 holding that both federal equitable tolling
and state tolling doctrines applied to a 10b-5 action. Strangely,
however, the Seventh Circuit criticized the district court in Norris
v. Wirtz for applying state tolling principles "despite the many
holdings of this court that federal law supplies the tolling doc-
trines .... ",209 The court cited Suslick as an example of its hold-
ings that federal law supplied the tolling doctrine, but later in the
opinion reiterated that Suslick stood for the proposition that both
federal and state tolling doctrines apply.
d. no tolling
Some commentators have suggested that no tolling doctrine ap-
plies. The Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for
Implied Actions concludes that it is "inescapable ... that Congress
did not intend equitable tolling to apply in actions under the se-
curities laws."21 0 The Task Force found it incongruous that Con-
gress made it clear no tolling doctrine applied to the limitations
periods for express actions, yet the courts routinely apply the toll-
ing doctrine to the implied 10b-5 actions.2 '
IV. ALTERNATIVES
Aside from continuing in the present state of confusion, there
are two approaches to the problem. Either the Supreme Court or
Congress must give the courts guidance regarding the limitations
period applicable to actions brought under Rule 10b-5.
207. Andrews v. Heinhold Commodities, 771 F.2d 184, 186 (7th Cir. 1985); accord Nor-
ris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987) (court suggested that perhaps state tolling
rules would be more appropriate in a 10b-5 action).
208. 741 F.2d 1000, 1004-06 (7th Cir. 1984).
209. 818 F.2d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir. 1987).
210. 41 Bus. Law. 645, 655 (1986) (note omitted).
211. Id. Legislative history supports this conclusion. H.R. CONG. REP. No. 1838, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 32, 36, 42 (1934); 78 CONG. REc. 8198-8203 (May 7, 1934). See also American
Law Institute, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1727(b) and comment 3(b) (1980).
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A. Supreme Court action
Supreme Court action is an appealing solution to the confusion
surrounding 10b-5 limitations periods because the private right of
action under Rule 10b-5 is a creature of judicial invention in the
first place. It is a logical progression for the courts to also deter-
mine the limitations period.
1. state limitations period
If the Supreme Court acts to restore order to this confused area
of law, it could follow the Garcia decision. In Garcia the Court
held that the personal injury statute of each state applies to all
section 1983 actions brought within the state. With respect to Rule
10b-5, a similar approach would be to hold that either the limita-
tions period for common law fraud actions or actions under state
Blue Sky law brought within each state applies to all 10b-5 actions
brought within the state. Use of any single state limitations period
in the area of federal securities laws, however, would be at odds
with recent Supreme Court observations that borrowing a state
limitations period is more appropriate in instances where Congress
creates a cause of action but neglects to enact a limitations period
than in instances where courts imply a cause of action from a stat-
utory scheme that contains limitations ' periods for related causes of
action.212 In addition, both the fraud and Blue Sky limitations pe-
riods are inappropriate for other reasons.
Fraud statutes are imperfect analogies to 10b-5 actions. One
purpose of the Rule is to add another layer of protection to inves-
tors who are not adequately protected by the common law.2 13 Rule
10b-5 also appears to be evolving away from application of tradi-
tional common law fraud concepts, such as the requirements of re-
liance 14 and scienter. 1 5
212. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 68 n.4 (1981) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 n.12 (1983).
213. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 990 n. 22 (1988); accord Herman & McLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 744-45 (1975).
214. Reliance is now presumed in two types of cases: non-disclosure and fraud on the
market cases. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the Supreme
Court stated:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, posi-
tive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the
facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have consid-
ered them important in the making of his decision.
Id. at 153-54. Thus, in non-disclosure cases the reliance requirement was relaxed in recogni-
1989
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Universal application of the common law fraud limitations pe-
riod is also unsatisfactory because, unlike section 1983 actions,
Rule 10b-5 actions frequently involve plaintiffs from many states.
In addition, although personal injury statutes are generally short,
there is a lack of uniformity among fraud limitations periods. It
has already been noted that common-law fraud limitations periods
range from one to ten years. Thus, plaintiffs in some states would
still have an advantage over plaintiffs in other states and forum
shopping would continue to be attractive.
Blue Sky laws are also imperfect analogies to 10b-5 actions be-
cause they often differ in important respects from 10b-5. They may
provide a remedy only for buyers and not for sellers of securities.21
They may also differ from 10b-5 by not requiring scienter or not
requiring reliance for recovery.21 7 In addition, not all states have
Blue Sky laws, a reason the Supreme Court found persuasive in
Malley-Duff for not applying residual limitations periods to RICO
actions. Finally, provisions under Blue Sky laws creating private
rights of action have greater similarity to actions under other sec-
tions of the Exchange Act than to Rule 10b-5 actions.
2. federal limitations period
A second type of Supreme Court action is adoption of the limita-
tions scheme from federal securities laws. This approach is consis-
tent with the Malley-Duff decision in which the Supreme Court
adopted a limitations period from the Clayton Act for RICO ac-
tions. Under this approach, forum shopping would no longer bene-
fit plaintiffs, decreasing the amount of litigation over choice of
laws.
Either of two limitations periods under the federal securities
laws could be adopted. The Court could hold, as did the Data Ac-
cess court, that the one-year/three-year scheme applies to all 10b-5
actions. One advantage to adopting this limitations scheme is that
tion of the impossibility of proving reliance in such a case.
Reliance is also presumed in fraud on the market cases. This theory is based on the hy-
pothesis that the market accurately values securities based on all available information. A
plaintiff purchasing securities relies on the integrity of the market to accurately value those
securities. See generally, Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 445 U.S 224 (1988); Note, The Fraud-On-
the-Market Theory, 94 HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975).
215. Although mere negligence does not meet the scienter requirement under Rule
10b-5, recklessness is sufficient. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 194 n.12
(1976); Wise v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 596 F. Supp. 1391, 1394 (D. Del. 1984).
216. Wood v. Combustion Eng'g Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 345-46 (5th Cir. 1981).
217. Id. at 345-46.
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it would prevent a plaintiff from bringing suit under Rule 10b-5
solely to avoid the short statutes of limitations applicable to ex-
press remedies. One disadvantage to adopting this limitations
scheme is that a fraud, if hidden for more than three years, is no
longer actionable in light of holdings with respect to express ac-
tions that tolling does not apply to the three-year outside limit.
Use of the one-year/three-year limitations scheme without further
analysis also overlooks the enactment of the ITSFEA"I just one
year after the Data Access decision.
The ITSFEA provides a second federal limitations period that
could apply to 10b-5 actions. The Act codifies private actions for
two types of persons that have long been allowed to bring actions
under Rule 10b-5, those who trade contemporaneously with inside
traders and others who are injured by inside trading."1 9 The IT-
SFEA is similar in purpose to Rule 10b-5 in that both are intended
to protect investors from fraudulent securities purchases and sales.
They differ in the sense that the ITSFEA applies only to certain
types of acts, whereas Rule 10b-5 is a catchall provision.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has recently advo-
cated application of the five-year limitations provision from the
ITSFEA to all private 10b-5 actions. In Lebman v. Aktiebolaget
Electrolux, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the dis-
trict court's application of the Texas fraud limitations period in
218. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-
.704, § 5, 102 Stat. 4680-81 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1). The Act provides:
(a) PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION BASED ON CONTEMPORANEOUS TRAD-
ING.-Any person who violates any provision of this title or the rule or regulations
thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, non-
public information shall be liable in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction
to any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities that is
the subject of such violation, has purchased (where such violation is based on a sale
of securities) or sold (where such violation is based on a purchase of securities) securi-
ties of the same class.
(4) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-No action may be brought under this section
more than 5 years after the date of the last transaction that is the subject of the
violation.
Id.
219. In introducing the Act, Representative Markey stated:
Courts have repeatedly recognized an implicit right of action in insider trading cases,
and this bill would codify an express private right of action for two classes of persons:
those who traded the same class of securities "contemporaneously" with the inside
trader and tipper, and other persons who can demonstrate an injury by an insider
trading violation.
Id. 134 CONG. REC. E2583 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988); see also Comments of Rep. Dingell, 134
CONG. REc. E2608 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1988).
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light of Garcia and Malley-Duff. The court affirmed the district
court's application of the state fraud limitations period, finding
that it was not incompatible with recent Supreme Court
decisions.2
The plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme
Court invited the Solicitor General to file an amicus curiae brief
expressing the views of the United States. 22' Addressing the issue
of the appropriate limitations period, the Commission argued that
a limitations period drawn from federal law was more appropriate,
and specifically, that the limitations period from the ITSFEA was
the most appropriate. The ITSFEA, it argued, is a better reflection
of Congressional intent since it is newly enacted and codifies cer-
tain types of Rule 10b-5 actions.222 The Commission also noted
that the short limitations periods under the Exchange Act apply to
remedies that are less difficult to prove223 and are shorter than
most of the state limitations periods currently applied.224 Finally,
the Commission pointed out that application of the shorter limita-
tions period would result in litigation over whether the facts of a
particular case brought the case within ITSFEA, resulting in appli-
cation of the five-year limitations period rather than the one-year/
three-year period that could apply to other 10b-5 actions.
Although the Commission advocated application of the five-year
provision, it suggested that the petition for a writ of certiorari be
denied because the court of appeals did not have the opportunity
to consider whether the limitations period from the ITSFEA was
appropriate.225 Decisions by the courts of appeals on this issue
would also be helpful to the Supreme Court in eventually ruling on
the issue. The Supreme Court subsequently denied the petition for
a writ of certiorari in Lebman.226
Use of both the one-and-three limitations scheme and the five-
year limitations period is also possible. As Judge Pollack observed
220. 854 F.2d 1319 (1988) (Table).
221. 109 S. Ct. 1526 (1989).
222. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13-15, Lehman v. Aktiebolaget
Electorolux, (U.S. June 6, 1989) (No. 88-1114).
223. Id. at 16 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384 & n.18
(1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 207-10 (1976) (both contrasting liability
for negligence under the express causes of action with the requirement of scienter under
Rule 10b-5).
224. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, Lebman v. Aktiebolaget Elec-
trolux, (U.S. June 6, 1989) (No. 88-1114).
225. Id. at 4-5.
226. Lebman v. Aktiebolaget Electrolux, 109 S. Ct. 3214 (1989).
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in Ceres, actions under 10b-5 are sometimes akin to actions against
issuers and at other times akin to insider trading. This approach
recognizes the difference between cases where someone trades on
non-public information and cases where an issuer's annual report
or press release contains misleading information resulting in a
fraud on the market. When insider trading occurs, the one in pos-
session of non-public information has an advantage over other
traders in the market. When an issuer issues a false annual report
or press release, all shareholders trade based on the total mix of
information in the market, including the misleading information.
Thus, based on Judge Pollack's observation, the five-year limita-
tions period would be more appropriate in actions arising from the
facts of the first example, while the one-year/three-year limitations
scheme would be more appropriate in actions arising from the facts
of the second example.
As the Commission argued in its amicus briefs in both Lebman
and Ceres, however, the drawback to using both limitations peri-
ods from the federal securities laws is that artful pleading becomes
the deciding factor. Plaintiffs who miss the one-year deadline will
attempt to frame their complaints in such a way that the five-year
limitations period applies. The end result will be that, rather than
litigating which state limitations period applies, parties will litigate
which federal limitations period applies.
Nevertheless, use of both limitations schemes from the federal
securities laws narrows the choice of a limitations period consider-
ably from the multitude of state limitations periods that may cur-
rently apply. This approach would also prevent forum shopping for
statute of limitations reasons.
B. Congressional action
Action by Congress to resolve the limitations problem could be
of three types. Congress could make the private right of action that
courts have determined is implied under Rule 10b-5 an express
cause of action and, at the same time, enact an express limitations
period. Arguably, this has been accomplished to a limited extent
by enactment of the ITSFEA. Congress could also enact a catchall
limitations period for any actions implied under the federal securi-
ties laws. This action would affirm the courts' longstanding tradi-
tion of implying private rights of action under certain provisions of
the securities laws.
Finally, Congress could enact a residual limitations period for all
federal actions, whether express or implied, to which no other limi-
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tations period applies.22 7 This type of statute will cure the prob-
lem, not only with respect to Rule 10b-5, but also with respect to
any other causes of action lacking a limitations period. It would
also do away with the absorption doctrine and courts would no
longer be faced with the question of which of several state limita-
tions periods applies. This solution would also result in efficient
use of judicial resources because courts would no longer be faced
with the question of what limitations period applies when Congress
creates a new cause of action but neglects to enact a limitations
period or when courts imply a cause of action from a federal
statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The limitations issue in Rule 10b-5 actions has reached an al-
most unbearable state of confusion. Although a Supreme Court
holding that the limitations period for 10b-5 actions must be
drawn from federal securities laws would ameliorate those
problems connected with forum shopping and choice of laws, the
problems associated with characterization of the 10b-5 claim will
remain if both limitations periods from federal securities law are
applied. In the event that the Court does not hold that either the
five-year or one-year/three-year limitations period-but not
both-applies, the only solution is for Congress to enact a residual
limitations period for actions implied or expressed under the fed-
eral securities laws to which no other limitations period applies. In
lieu of that, a residual limitations period for all federal causes of
action will solve the problem under the securities laws and prevent
a similar state of confusion from arising in other areas of the law.
227. See infra n.6 for a discussion of a bill containing a residual federal limitations
period that was proposed in 1945. Such a statute must provide a limitations period for ac-
tions for both money damages and other types of relief in order to bring actions for rescis-
sion within the purview of the statute.
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